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 One central question in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the ontological status of 
mathematical entities. Platonists argue that abstract, mathematical entities exist, while 
nominalists argue that they do not. Scientific realism is the position that science is (roughly) true 
and the objects it describes exist. There are two major competing arguments for platonism on the 
basis of scientific realism: Indispensability and Explanation. In this paper I consider which 
argument the platonist ought to prefer by comparing their motivations and results. I conclude 
that, given the current role of mathematics in our best scientific theories, Explanation does not 
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 One central question in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the ontological status of 
mathematical entities. Platonists argue that abstract, mathematical entities exist, while nominalists 
argue that they do not. It is a virtue of a theory if it commits us to fewer kinds of entities.1 If 
platonism is to be accepted even though it expands our ontology, then, it must be motivated. One 
source of independent support for platonism has been through scientific realism. A central 
commitment of contemporary scientific realism is naturalism, the claim that scientific practice 
ought to determine our ontological commitments. If scientific practice includes mathematical 
entities in ontologically committing roles that non-mathematical (nominalistic) entities cannot 
play, then naturalism supports the existence of mathematical entities. In this paper I consider two 
major competing accounts of what this role might be and thus the basis on which scientific realism 
supports platonism.  
 The traditional argument for platonism from scientific realism uses the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability thesis (Indispensability). This thesis asserts the existence of all the entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. Platonists argue that mathematical entities are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories and thus, using Indispensability, that they exist. A 
newer platonist alternative narrows the ontological focus through the explanatory indispensability 
thesis (Explanation). According to Explanation, not all scientific roles, even if they are 
indispensable, are ontologically committing. Only appropriately explanatory roles garner 
ontological commitment. The explanatory platonist argues that mathematical entities play such 
roles in our best scientific theories (and do so indispensably). I will argue against this claim. In our 
current best theories, mathematical entities are not required to play explanatory roles of the kind 
                                                          




required by explanatory platonism. This means that Explanation is not compatible with naturalist 
platonism. The scientific realist platonist, therefore, should endorse Indispensability. 
 I begin by laying out scientific realism and the principles it is based on. I then show how 
Indispensability develops from scientific realism and how Explanation develops as a reaction to 
perceived problems for Indispensability. After laying out these two competing ontological 
conditions, I show how the explanatory platonist uses Explanation and examples of mathematical 
explanation to argue for the existence of mathematical entities.  I then argue that, in order for 
mathematical explanations to explain, they require a supplementary principle, Determination. 
Assuming Determination, I lay out two accounts, one platonist (Direct Mathematical Explanation 
– DME) and one nominalist (Indirect Mathematical Explanation – IME), of the role that 
mathematics plays in mathematical explanations. I argue that, as the debate stands, the nominalist 
account (IME) is a better explanation. I then introduce the prediction criterion, a tool for assessing 
explanations, and argue that it offers the best hope for explanatory platonism. I conclude with the 
state of scientific realist platonism, given current scientific evidence. 
Scientific Realism 
 Scientific realism is, roughly, the thesis that scientific theories aim at being true and that to 
accept a theory is to accept that it is (at least approximately) true.2  According to Hilary Putnam, 
the defining positive motivation for scientific realism “is that it is the only philosophy that doesn’t 
make the success of science a miracle.”3 This is the  no-miracles argument. One central tenet of 
scientific realism which enshrines this desire to avoid miracles is inference to the best explanation 
(IBE).4 According to IBE, we should infer the truth of whatever the best explanation of a given 
                                                          
2 Putnam (1975). 
3 Putnam (1975): 73. 




phenomenon is (so long as there is one). IBE only requires inference in cases where there is at 
least one explanation which meets a minimal explanatory threshold. The best explanation is 
whichever theory explains the most and meets the other theoretical virtues we value. Science aims 
at producing the best theories, and IBE supports realism towards those theories. 
 This realist drive to avoid miracles is what motivates existentially committing to various 
kinds of unobservable physical entities, like neutrinos or electrons.5 We can see an example of 
scientific realist thinking in the molecular explanation of Brownian motion. Small, observable 
particles suspended in a fluid do not sink; they move about quickly and haphazardly without 
coming to rest.6 Why? The explanation (from Albert Einstein7 and Jean Perrin8)  is that fluids 
themselves consist of unobservable molecules. When a fluid is heated, its molecules receive an 
energy increase and move about. The motion of those molecules causes the motion of the small 
observables.9 That this explanation generally accords with the phenomena would not be enough to 
make its success miraculous if these molecules did not exist. More is needed to confirm the 
explanation. 
 This confirmation came using a formula developed by Einstein10 which predicts the 
distance traveled by observable particles (the mean square displacement) as a function of (a) 
observable properties of the setup and the suspended particles and (b) constants derived from the 
molecular-kinetic theory of gases, chiefly among them Avogadro’s number N (the number of 
atoms in a gram molecule of a gas).11 Perrin later experimentally verified that precisely this 
                                                          
5 Field (1980): 16. 
6 Perrin (1913): 83. This phenomenon was discovered by Robert Brown in 1827. 
7 Einstein (1905). 
8 Perrin (1913). 
9 Perrin (1913): 86. In Perrin’s words, “Every granule suspended in a fluid is being struck continually by the 
molecules in its neighborhood and receives impulses from them that do not in general exactly counterbalance each 
other; consequently it is tossed hither and thither in an irregular fashion”. 
10 Einstein (1905): 7. 




formula holds for Brownian motion.12 Perrin also showed that the values of Avogadro’s number 
derived from Einstein’s equation and his own Brownian motion experiments are highly consistent 
with the values determined by the observations of other phenomena with molecular explanations.13 
He concludes that, “Such decisive agreement can leave no doubt as to the origin of the Brownian 
movement”;14 and thus that unobservable molecules exist. The realist argues, along with Perrin, 
that if the unobservable molecules found in this explanation do not in fact exist, then the success 
of the molecular explanation of Brownian motion and its agreement with other scientific 
explanations built on molecular theory is rendered a coincidence and a miracle. The traditional 
argument for platonism, based on the Quine-Putnam indispensability thesis, seeks to apply this 
scientific realist reasoning to mathematical entities.  
Indispensability 
 The indispensability argument:15 
1. We ought to be existentially committed to all and only those entities that are 
indispensable16 to our best scientific theories – Indispensability. 
2. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.  
3. Therefore, we ought to be existentially committed to mathematical entities. 
The second premise is an empirical matter, and subject to actual scientific practice.17 The first 
premise, Indispensability, rests on two general commitments: (1) Quinean naturalism, which is the 
claim that science is the first and best (or only) arbiter of ontological commitment; and (2) 
confirmation holism,18 which is the claim that “the various posits of a theory can only be confirmed 
                                                          
12 Maiocchi (1990): 269. 
13 Perrin (1913): 105. 
14 Perrin (1913): 105. 
15 Something like this argument is scattered through Quine’s writings. See, e.g., Quine (1981): 149-150. 
16 An entity is theoretically dispensable if a “reasonably attractive” alternate theory without quantification over that 
entity can explain the same phenomena (Field 1980: 8.).   
17 Here I assume this premise.   
18 Putnam offers an alternative argument for indispensability that requires a less strict standard than confirmation 




in toto, and distinctions between the precise role of different posits do not matter.”19 Naturalism 
ensures that scientific practice is the proper domain for determinations of ontological commitment, 
and confirmation holism ensures that all scientific posits are treated ontologically equally.  
 The thesis follows from the principle of IBE. The best scientific theories are best because 
they are most explanatory and meet the other theoretical virtues we value. Because of confirmation 
holism, a theory can only be confirmed as a whole and so its explanatory success can also be only 
assessed as a whole. For a theory to be best, it must best explain the phenomena. Therefore, IBE 
can be applied and we can infer the truth of the theory and the existence of its posits. 
 In platonism motivated by the indispensability thesis (Quinean platonism), mathematical 
entities play an organizing role which is no different from the role played by any other entity. If 
an entity indispensably appears in all our best scientific theories, whatever the context, the 
indispensability thesis commits us to its existence. Looking back to the molecular explanation, 
according to the indispensability thesis we are not only committed to the existence of the 
unobservable molecules, but also to any other indispensable posits in the explanation. For example, 
if Avogadro’s number is indispensable in the Brownian motion explanation, then the 
indispensability thesis commits us to the existence of that number.   
Explanation 
 Not all of those attracted to scientific realism and the existence of unobservable scientific 
entities (electrons, quarks, etc.), however, accept this argument. Scientific realist objections to 
Indispensability focus on two claims: (a) that confirmation holism is not justified; and (b) that the 
Indispensability is too strong and commits us to the existence of more entities than is desirable. 
Penelope Maddy, for instance, argues that holism is insufficiently supported and may contradict 
                                                          




certain aspects of scientific and mathematical practice.20  
 Nominalists who reject confirmation holism and the Quinean platonist ontology must offer 
an alternative to Indispensability which maintains the no-miracles motivation and explains why 
the motivation does not require commitment to mathematical entities. This requires a principled 
distinction between the roles in scientific theories that require existence to be successful and the 
roles that do not. Nominalists often point to explanation and causation as serving to distinguish 
these sorts of roles.21 Here is an argument for how that might follow from the scientific realist 
principles I have introduced.  
 One scientific role which I have already identified as bearing special ontological 
importance is explanation. I introduced IBE as a central scientific realist confirmational tool. 
Under Indispensability, only whole theories can be confirmed. This means that IBE can only apply 
to theories as a whole. Without the framework of confirmation holism, however, IBE instead 
applies specifically to the explanatory elements of a theory. If only some of the indispensable 
posits in a theory are playing explanatory roles, then IBE only applies to those explanatory entities.  
Scientific realism and Quinean platonism presuppose IBE, so using IBE to guide ontology does 
not require further or extra-scientific commitments from the nominalist. 
 But mathematics does appear in explanations (such as Avogadro’s number), sometimes 
indispensably. The condition ‘appearing indispensably in explanations’ is not sufficiently fine-
grained to return the ontological results nominalists are looking for. Nominalists must therefore 
offer a more limiting condition, but one that still focuses on explanation and is thus supported by 
IBE. Without IBE, ontological commitment on the basis of the condition would not follow from 
scientific realism alone.  
                                                          
20 See Maddy (1992). 




 The nominalist must then distinguish still further between the ways in which different 
posits appear in explanations. This further distinction too should follow from scientific realist 
principles. One way to make this distinction involves looking back to no-miracles. On this strategy, 
the nominalist must claim that only certain posits play explanatory roles that require them to exist.  
The existence of explanatory entities only serves to avoid miracles, and is thus only genuinely 
explanatory, if those entities themselves ensure the existence of the phenomena they explain. The 
standard model for how entities might ensure the existence of phenomena is causation. On this 
picture, then, entities can only explain phenomena that they causally determine;22 e.g., the 
existence of unobservable molecules in a fluid only explains the motion of an observable particle 
if the molecules themselves cause that motion. Mathematics is assumed to be causally inert, and 
so if scientific realism only commits us to the existence of causal entities, then mathematics need 
not be included in our ontology.  
 ‘Explanatory’ roles that do not involve causation are, on this account, not genuinely 
explanatory and therefore not ontologically committing. However, we have assumed that 
mathematics appears indispensably in many of our best explanations. On this account, any sort of 
explanation or explanatory role which does not involve causal relations can only explain 
derivatively, by standing proxy for (or indexing) some real explanation.23 For example, 
Avogadro’s number is used in the Brownian motion example to compare different molecular 
phenomena. The number serves to indicate an equality of size relation between certain collections 
of molecules. That size relation does not hold between the number and the molecules, nor does the 
number itself determine any facts about those molecules. The number only describes the 
molecules. While the molecules must exist in order to bear a causal relation (and thus avoid making 
                                                          
22 Or, in a statistical explanation, causally support the phenomena. 




that relation – and the explanation that depends on it - miraculous), the number need not exist in 
order for the description to hold. The non-existence of the number is not miraculous. In general, 
mathematics is used in scientific explanations merely to index facts about causal entities, including 
the presence of determination relations. This indexical role, even if it is indispensable, is not itself 
explanatory. Only a causal role can be explanatory. 
 This account can be formalized as an alternative to the indispensability thesis. The 
Explanatory Indispensability Argument: 
1. We ought to be existentially committed to all and only those entities that play an 
indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories – Explanation.24 
2. Only causal entities can have explanatory power – Causation.  
3. Mathematics is causally inert – Inert. 
4. Therefore, we ought not to be existentially committed to mathematical posits. 
I will refer to nominalists who endorse this thesis or something like it as explanatory nominalists. 
Explanatory Platonism 
 Explanatory platonism seizes upon this account of no-miracles and the resources of the 
explanatory thesis as a way to support and further specify scientific realist platonism. It is 
motivated by similar concerns to those of explanatory nominalists. Explanatory platonists, such as 
Mark Colyvan,25 want to further support platonism by either hedging against the Quinean 
indispensability thesis or denying the thesis entirely. They worry that the indispensability thesis, 
built as it is on confirmation holism, may be inconsistent with scientific practice or may commit 
us to unjustified or undesirable nonmathematical ideal posits (e.g., frictionless planes and ideal 
centers of mass). Explanatory platonists thus accept Explanation and argue for the existence of 
mathematical entities on explanatory grounds.  
                                                          
24 Explanation is a restatement of the first premise of Alan Baker’s “enhanced” indispensability thesis (Baker 2009): 
613. 




 If Explanation is to support the existence of mathematical entities, then mathematical 
entities must be able to play explanatory roles. Given Inert and Causation, they are excluded from 
such roles. The explanatory platonist must therefore deny one of these premises. Typically, they 
accept Inert, and so must deny Causation, that the causal model is the best model for explanation.26  
Colyvan does this, not by suggesting an alternative model for explanation, but by side-stepping 
the question. He argues that science does not limit itself to causal explanations and that scientific 
practice produces non-causal explanations. 27 If so, the causal explanation model cannot be correct, 
since the ontological debate should be responsive to scientific practice. To motivate this claim, 
here are two proposed examples of how mathematics can be used to explain physical phenomena.28  
Examples of Mathematical Explanation 
 The first is an explanation of why honeycombs are hexagonal.29 Bees build their 
honeycombs with a hexagonal structure. Biologists, beginning with Darwin,30 have hypothesized 
that the explanation of this fact has to do with efficiency. Natural selection pressures bees to favor 
the arrangement that most efficiently uses energy and resources. Bees which use less wax in 
building combs will be more successful and will be selected for.  The dominance of the hexagonal 
honeycomb strategy suggests the honeycomb conjecture: a hexagonal grid represents the best way 
to divide a surface into regions of equal area with the least total perimeter.31 This conjecture was 
                                                          
26 See Baker (2009) for more.  
27 Colyvan (1998). 
28 These are two of the most commonly discussed examples, probably because they are so easily described. As some 
of the most familiar cases, they have also faced many objections and may not be the strongest examples available. 
Here I assume that some explanations of this kind go through. For a collection of additional examples, see Mancosu 
(2008) and Bangu (2017). 
29 This example comes from Lyon and Colyvan (2008). 
30 Darwin (1998): 350. “[...] that individual swarm which thus made the best cells with least labour, and least waste 
of honey in the secretion of wax, having succeeded best, and having transmitted their newly-acquired economical 
instincts to new swarms, which in their turn will have had the best chance of succeeding in the struggle for 
existence.” 




only recently proved, by Thomas Hales.32 Because of this mathematical proof, we know that the 
most efficient arrangement for honeycombs will be hexagonal. Because of the evolutionary factor, 
we know that any bees that happen upon this arrangement will continue to build their combs with 
it, ceteris paribus. This is the best explanation science has produced for the phenomenon of bees 
in general building their combs with this particular arrangement.  
 Another common example in the literature seeks to explain why certain species of cicada 
of the genus Magicicada in North America have certain particular life-cycle periods.33 Three of 
these species have life-cycle periods of 13 or 17 years. During this period, they remain as nymphs 
underground, only to emerge together when the cycle is ending. The particular length of these 
periods is explained, as in the honeycomb case, by a combination of evolutionary and 
mathematical factors. First, it is advantageous for the emergence of the cicadas to intersect with 
the presence of the fewest predators and the fewest subspecies with different periods. This is 
achieved by having periods which intersect with the smallest number of other possible periods. 
The numbers with the fewest factors are prime, meaning that prime life-cycle periods will intersect 
with the least number of possible periods for other organisms. Therefore, cicadas ought to have a 
prime life-cycle period. Various other evolutionary factors in the development of the cicada show 
that having a life cycle between 12 and 18 years long is beneficial. The only prime numbers 
between 12 and 18 are 13 and 17. This explains why, given a few factors, these specific life-cycle 
periods are optimal.  
 These explanations are not causal, undercutting Causation. The explanandum in both cases 
is generic, ranging over all the members of the species of bee or cicada. There are no candidate 
causal explanations for these explananda, because of their wide scope.  While there could be a 
                                                          
32 Hales (2001). 




causal explanation (or disjunctive manifold of causal explanations) for the behavior of every 
individual bee or cicada who follows these patterns, listing the physical and chemical causes of 
their behavior, the fact that all these causal explanations result in the same phenomena cannot be 
causally explained.34 That these facts need explanation can be denied, but doing so is inconsistent 
with naturalism, because these explanations come from science, and with no-miracles, because 
denying the explanation of a phenomenon makes it miraculous.35 
 As in explanatory nominalism, these sorts of examples in which mathematical entities play 
a distinctly explanatory role are supposed to be distinguished from explanations in which 
mathematics appears but plays a merely representational, descriptive, or indexing role. For 
example, the appearance of Avogadro’s number in the explanation of Brownian motion still seems 
to be merely indexical.  
Determination 
 The explanatory platonist position is that without the mathematics in explanations like 
honeycomb and cicada examples, the phenomena they explain are inexplicable. With no 
competitor explanation, the mathematical explanation36 is trivially the best, and therefore (if the 
explanation meets the threshold requirement) Explanation and IBE justify commitment to the 
mathematical entities doing the explaining. There is, however, a problem with this account. The 
purpose of explanatory platonism is to provide a stronger and more specific argument for the 
                                                          
34 For more on this claim, see Lyon (2012). Lyon also argues, following Jackson and Pettit (1990), that many 
explanations (not all mathematical) are of this kind. Denial of this kind of explanation thus significantly reduces the 
available explanatory resources.  
35 This argument can be resisted. Sorin Bangu, for example, argues that the explananda of the cicada explanation is 
not purely physical but is mixed physical/mathematical fact (Bangu 2008). As such, the naturalist point might not 
apply. 
36 Unless otherwise noted, I use ‘mathematical explanation’ to refer to scientific explanations of physical 
phenomena in which mathematics appears indispensably. ‘Extra’-mathematical explanations are referred to as such 
to distinguish them from intra-mathematical explanations – mathematical explanations of mathematical phenomena 




existence of mathematical entities than the argument from Indispensability. Simply presenting 
non-causal explanations in which mathematics appears, as Colyvan and Baker do, does not clarify 
the distinction between truly mathematical explanations like the cicada case and those that employ 
mathematics on other (indexing, representational, or organizational) grounds. Nor does presenting 
such explanations justify making an ontological distinction between such entities on the basis of 
no-miracles. Just as the explanatory nominalist used Causation to support the determination 
account of no-miracles, the explanatory platonist must show how the mathematical entities in the 
explanations determine the phenomena being explained. This requires committing to an alternative 
to Causation, which identifies the relevant determination relation grounding these explanations.  
 Causal relation is able to serve the function required of it in grounding explanations 
because it is a species of natural necessity relation, and thus able to reduce explanation to 
determination relations. But any relation capable of determining or necessitating should be able to 
serve that function. Expressing this generically gives us Determination: Only causal or 
nomologically determining entities can have explanatory power.37 Mathematical explanations, as 
I stated above, cannot be causal. They must then rely on alternative accounts of explanation, like 
the deductive-nomological model, and use something like laws of nature to provide the underlying 
fundamental necessity relations required by the determination no-miracles account. If a 
mathematical explanation is genuinely explanatory, then it must present some entities or properties 
which nomologically determine its explanandum. I now develop two different possible accounts 
of which entities bear the nomological relations required if the proposed mathematical 
explanations are to be explanatory - Direct Mathematical Explanation and Indirect Mathematical 
Explanation. Given Determination, whether Explanation supports explanatory nominalism or 
                                                          





explanatory platonism is at stake. 
Direct Mathematical Explanation 
 Mathematical entities are incapable of bearing the causal relations required for explanation 
under Causation, but they are potential bearers of the nomological relations required for 
explanation under Determination. This allows the possibility of Direct Mathematical Explanation 
(DME): In mathematical explanations, mathematical entities nomologically determine physical 
facts. Nora Berenstain is an explanatory platonist proponent of this sort of explanation.38 She 
argues that, for mathematical explanations to be explanatory, the nomological relations involved 
must relate mathematical entities themselves to the physical phenomena. She additionally argues 
that the best candidate for this relation is instantiation, where a mathematical structure which has 
explanatory features is instantiated in the phenomena being explained.39 To see how this looks in 
application, consider the explanation of the fact that honeycomb has the same structural 
arrangement. On this account, the (mathematical) hexagonal grid is instantiated in the physical 
honeycomb. Because the hexagonal grid has the property of being the most efficient way to divide 
a plane into regions of equal area, the honeycomb will also have that property. The honeycomb 
which has this efficiency property will be the optimal honeycomb strategy and will be selected for. 
Under this model, the mathematical grid itself directly determines that the hexagonal honeycomb 
is the most efficiently arranged honeycomb.  
 It looks like DME might be able to account for the explanatory power of mathematical 
explanations. If DME is the best explanation of this explanatory power, then IBE justifies inferring 
the existence of the nomological relations it posits between mathematical entities and the 
phenomena being explained. If mathematical entities are nomologically active then, according to 
                                                          
38 Berenstain (2016). I have simplified the account. 




Explanation and Determination, mathematical entities exist and explanatory platonism is 
supported. For IBE to apply, however, DME must offer the best explanation. If the only 
explanation of mathematical explanation is that the mathematics itself nomologically determines 
the physical phenomena, then it is the best. But if there is an alternative, DME must be argued for. 
The task, then, is to assess whether there is another way to non-miraculously ground mathematical 
explanation that does not require mathematical entities to directly determine physical phenomena.  
Nominalism and Mathematical Explanation 
 In developing an indexical alternative to DME, I must first develop some indexing 
resources. The first place to look is to those who have a vested interest in avoiding DME: 
nominalists. David Liggins40 and Mary Leng41 are both nominalists who accept that some 
phenomena like those in the honeycomb and cicada examples should be explained. They each offer 
alternative accounts of the mathematical explanations of such phenomena. I will argue that neither 
of these accounts successfully grounds mathematical explanations nomologically, as required by 
Explanation and Causation, but that they lay the groundwork for a nominalistic competitor to 
DME.  
Liggins 
 Liggins seeks to generate a nominalist account of mathematical explanations. He argues 
that even platonists ought not to accept accounts, like DME, on which mathematics is difference-
making.42 Because he rejects DME-type explanations, on his account the explanatory resources of 
mathematical explanations are very limited and do not rely on mathematics. 
                                                          
40 Liggins (2014). 
41 Leng (2012).  
42 Liggins (2014): 4. He argues for this point on the basis that difference-making is not part of our pre-theoretic idea 




 Liggins argues that if there is a relation between mathematics and physical phenomena in 
a putative mathematical explanation, that relation should obtain in virtue of a nominalistic property 
of the physical entities involved. In the cicada explanation, this concerns what he calls the “has-
life-cycle-in-years-of”43 relation between the numbers, 13 and 17, and the cicadas whose life-cycle 
periods are being explained. If a cicada bears the has-life-cycle-in-years-of relation to the number 
13 or the number 17, it should be in virtue of the fact that the cicadas have a nominalistic property 
like has-life-cycle-period-in-years-of-13 or has-life-cycle-period-in-years-of-17. Otherwise, the 
mathematics itself would be making a difference and play an unjustifiably strong role. Because the 
nominalistic property grounds the mathematical property, whatever is explanatory about the 
mathematical property is also grounded by the nominalistic property. This means, according to 
Liggins, that whatever is genuinely explanatory about mathematical explanations is not dependent 
upon mathematics. Therefore, the mathematical aspects of mathematical explanations can be 
disposed of without any loss in explanatory power. As a result, Liggins’ version of the cicada 
explanation is that these species of cicada have the life-cycle periods they do because of the brute 
fact that they have some physical property. This method of trivially rewriting mathematical 
explanations is meant to be universally applicable and allow him to easily nominalize explanations.  
 This account is not capable of generating explanations of equal strength to those of DME, 
which accepts the difference-making power of mathematics. There are two primary reasons for 
this. The first is that, because the account involves rewriting mathematical explanations, its 
explanations do not involve mathematical entities at all. It cannot, therefore, appeal to the 
underlying system of mathematical relations that make the platonist explanation an explanation. 
In the cicada case, the mathematical explanation explains by using facts about the relations 
                                                          




between certain numbers. Prime numbers have only themselves and 1 as factors. The numeric 
structure which entails that there are certain specific numbers with this feature is what allows the 
cicada explanation to be explanatory. In DME, because the number is instantiated in the life-cycle 
period, these facts about the number determine facts about the life-cycle period. In DME, then, 
mathematical properties of the number itself determine that that particular life-cycle period is 
optimal. For Liggins, on the other hand, the explanation cannot appeal to mathematical entities. 
This means he cannot explain why it should be some nominalistic property that explains the 
phenomena rather than any other. Moreover, it means he cannot identify nominalistically which 
property is serving as the explanans in any given rewritten mathematical explanation. Nothing in 
his account of the cicada explanation allows for the identification of the property has-life-cycle-
period-in-years-of-13, because that property is only understood as a replacement for the 
mathematical relation. While he can posit that there must be some such property, he has refused 
himself the resources to characterize such an explanans mathematically and offers no new 
resources for identifying it nominalistically. Without the explanans, there is no explanation. If a 
nominalist account is to compete with DME, it must solve this problem. 
 The second problem is that Liggins’ version of the explanation, even if there were an 
explanans, does not meet the condition set for explanation by Determination. He gives no account 
of determination or nomological relations between the unspecified nominalistic property and the 
cicada life-cycle period such that one can explain facts about the other. This explanation is thus a 
miracle, given the determination account of no-miracles. Liggins clearly has not offered us a 
similarly explanatory alternative to DME.  
 His account does, however, point us in the right direction. His nominalistic property 




nomological relations required by Determination. If an explanation can be generated with a 
nominalistic property like has-life-cycle-period-in-years-of-13 as the explanans, then IBE applied 
to the explanation again justifies the assertion of a nomological relation. But, as the first problem 
has not been addressed, there does not yet seem to be such an explanation. 
Leng 
 Leng’s account focuses on addressing the first problem I noted with Liggins account. She 
notes that certain mathematical explanations in science are structural.44 These explain through the 
structural characteristics of a given mathematical structure instantiated in a particular physical 
system. Liggins’ account did not allow him to take advantage of these features in explanation, and 
so he could not generate a convincing alternative to DME. Leng’s account, on the other hand, is 
specifically designed with the structural features of putative mathematical explanantia in mind. 
This requires explaining how these structural features can be attributed to physical objects without 
committing to the mathematical objects they putatively belong to.  
 Leng describes how this is supposed to work: 
 We can think of a mathematical structure as characterized by axioms. A physical system 
 instantiating that structure is one where those axioms are true when interpreted as about 
 that physical system. A structural explanation will explain a phenomenon by showing (a) 
 that the phenomenon occurs in a physical system instantiating a general mathematical 
 structure, and (b) the existence of that phenomenon is a consequence of the structure 
 characterizing axioms once suitably interpreted.45 
 
Here, Leng tries to access the intra-mathematical explanatory power of mathematical proofs by 
making the ‘instantiation’ of a mathematical structure merely metaphorical (it is as if the physical 
structure instantiates the mathematical structure) and follow from a nominalistically acceptable 
interpretation. Consider the honeycomb example. The mathematical portion of the explanation of 
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the honeycomb’s physical structure is based on the honeycomb theorem – the proof in discrete 
geometry that a hexagonal grid is the most efficient way to divide up a plane, with certain caveats. 
Leng claims that only a limited portion of mathematics is relevant to theorems like this and that 
the axioms characterizing that portion are sufficient to construct the proof. Moreover, only this 
proof is needed for the sake of the explanation, so only the area of mathematics which is relevant 
to it needs to be characterized. If the axioms which characterize the hexagonal grid and the portion 
of geometry relevant to it can be interpreted as about the structure of the honeycomb, then the 
honeycomb will ‘instantiate’ the hexagonal grid and proofs about the grid will be able to describe 
facts about the honeycomb. 
 If Leng’s account succeeds, then we have a non-miraculous scientific realist account of 
how mathematical resources can be applied to physical phenomena without ontological 
commitment to those resources. But her account falls short as an indexical account of mathematical 
explanation. While she addresses how mathematics can be employed indispensably in an 
explanatory context without playing a DME-type determination role, she does not offer an 
alternative candidate for the determination role. There needs to be an account of what the 
underlying nominalistic nomological relations are. Without such an account, there is no 
explanation under Determination. It is not yet clear what the mathematics in these explanations is 
indexing.  
Indirect Mathematical Explanation 
 Combining the virtues of these two theories, we can hopefully develop a plausible 
alternative to DME. Leng describes how the mathematical resources used to prove that a 
mathematical structure necessarily possesses a certain property relevant to scientific explanation 
can be applied to a physical entity without ontological commitment to that mathematical structure, 




argument to support an alternative to DME, we need a way of characterizing the ‘set of axioms 
which when suitably interpreted are true of a physical system’ in a way that is nominalistic and 
capable of bearing a nomological dependence relation.  
 Liggins’ account offers a strategy we can use to do this. If a mathematical axiomatization 
can be interpreted as being about an entity, it can be asserted that it is because that entity has a 
nominalistic property. This is the property of being such that the appropriate mathematical 
metaphor can be interpreted as about that entity. In the honeycomb example, this would be the 
nominalistic property of having-the-honeycomb-structure-of-hexagonal-grid. If this property is 
nomologically related to the similarly nominalistic property of using the fewest resources, then in 
every structure in which the first property appears (whenever the suitable interpretation of the 
honeycomb theorem axioms is possible) the second property (using the fewest resources) will also 
appear. The mathematics in the explanation describes this determination relation the nominalistic 
properties bear to one another without itself bearing any such nomological relations. Making an 
analogous move to Berenstain’s, if this account is the best explanation of how mathematical 
explanation is possible, then inference to that nomological relation is justified. I call this account 
Indirect Mathematical Explanation (IME): In mathematical explanations, mathematics serves only 
to index nomological relations between nominalistic entities.  
DME v. IME 
 To recap: The question at hand is whether the scientific realist platonist ought to endorse 
Indispensability or Explanation in order to ground her ontological commitment to mathematical 
entities. If the proponent of Explanation is to offer a more limited ontology than that of the Quinean 
platonist and maintain no-miracles, then she should endorse some principle like Determination to 




mathematics plays in these explanations – DME and IME.  
 Both DME and IME seem equally capable of showing how mathematical explanations can 
fulfill the requirements for explanation under Determination, with some potential costs. Only 
under DME, however, do mathematical entities bear the nomological relations required for 
explanation under Determination. Given Explanation, that means that mathematical entities only 
exist if DME is true. IME is a nominalist account of mathematical explanation.46 Platonists who 
endorse both Explanation and Determination must endorse DME, if they are to remain platonists 
and retain mathematical entities in their ontology. However, recall that commitment to DME or 
IME must be through IBE in order to follow from scientific realist principles. IBE only applies to 
the best explanation, if there is one. If the explanatory platonist is going to endorse DME on 
scientific realist grounds, then DME must (1) offer a better explanation than IME and (2) meet a 
minimal explanatory threshold.  
 DME does not yet meet these conditions. Following the criterion of ontological simplicity, 
we should only accept mathematical entities into our ontology if they serve a function which 
nominalistic entities cannot. DME proposes that the role mathematics plays by bearing 
determination relations in mathematical explanation is such a function. But, since IME is able to 
give an account of the determination relations in such explanations, nominalistic entities can play 
all the ontologically committing roles available under Explanation + Determination. The 
simplicity of IME means that it is a better explanation than DME, and so IBE cannot be applied to 
                                                          
46 The platonist proponent of Explanation could also try to support platonism under IME. Mathematics under IME 
only indexes determination relations, and so this would require replacing Determination with something like 
Indexing: Only entities which are causal, nomologically active, or index such entities can have explanatory power. 
On this account, even indexing relations are miraculous if the indexing entities do not exist.  I see two problems with 
this: 1. It is not clear that the existence of indexing entities helps to avoid miracles, and so Indexing is unsupported 
by scientific realism. 2. Explanation and Indexing do not leave any room for non-ontologically committing 
indispensable roles, and so they entail Indispensability. This means that if the aim of explanatory platonism is to 




DME.47 If the platonist accepts DME and the existence of the relations and entities it entails 
without showing that DME is justified under IBE, then the commitment no longer follows from 
scientific realism.48 The failure of DME to justify IBE inference means that there are no 
ontologically committing explanatory roles for mathematical entities in the kinds of explanations 
we have seen, and thus that Explanation (given current scientific practice) does not support 
platonism.  
                                                          
47 I leave it an open question here whether IME blocks DME merely because it is better than DME, or whether IME 
meets the minimal threshold requirement for inference under IBE. At stake is whether explanatory nominalism can 
account for mathematical explanations. IME also requires some significant work. If this work is not done, then it is 
not clear whether IME meets the minimal threshold either, and Explanation cannot account for mathematical 
explanations.  E.g., IME:  
1.  Leaves the relation between mathematics and the nominalistic relations it indexes inexplicable. IME 
cannot explain why some portion of mathematics indexes a given relation, or else a determination relation 
would have to hold between the two and Explanation + Determination would ontologically commit us to 
the mathematics.  That this is unexplained is a cost to scientific realism because of no-miracles.  
2. Requires more work to demonstrate feasibility.  For IME to go through it should give conditions for the 
interpretation of axioms and answer questions like whether all mathematics is readily axiomatic, whether 
we can determine the required axioms, and whether we only ever need a limited set of axioms to account 
for a given explanation.  
48 The explanatory platonist could still argue that the way nominalistic entities in IME play the explanatory roles in 
mathematical explanations infringes more upon scientific realist principles and our other theoretical virtues than 
mathematical entities and their role in DME. The prospects for this argument are poor. Here are a few additional 
problems DME faces: 
1. Too strong. DME posits an unfamiliarly strong metaphysical role for mathematical entities, opposed to our 
pre-theoretic idea of what mathematics does.  
2. Ad hoc. Any particular choice about how mathematical difference-making occurs is insufficiently supported. 
Berenstain argues that we should view the relation between mathematical entities and physical phenomena 
as instantiation, but it’s not clear how that can be justified. 
3. Expanded mathematical ontology. Part of the motivation for explanatory platonism was to limit ontological 
commitments. But extra-mathematical explanations (scientific explanations of physical phenomena, like the 
cicada and honeycomb explanations) are not the only explanations that feature mathematical entities. 
Mathematicians treat a whole range of intra-mathematical claims/theories as explanatory (such as the 
honeycomb conjecture). Scientific realists (including Quine and explanatory platonists) standardly treat intra-
mathematical explanations as extra-scientific and therefore not ontologically relevant. But DME has trouble 
maintaining this distinction. Mathematical entities which we are committed to on the basis of extra-
mathematical explanations are not limited to appearances in extra-mathematical explanations. These entities 
also appear in intra-mathematical explanations (e.g., the hexagonal grid appears in the honeycomb 
explanation and the proof of the honeycomb conjecture), in which other mathematical posits explain their 
mathematical features and in which they explain other mathematical facts about other posits. The explanatory 
platonist must either accept all the other mathematical posits which bear explanatory relations to the 
mathematical entities they say exist (a significant expansion to their ontology and to the Quinean 
mathematical ontology) or deny that intra-mathematical explanations explain (contra mathematicians). 




 The problem for the explanatory platonist is that, by endorsing Determination, they have 
accepted a limitation on the set of features relevant to IBE. Under Determination, all it is to explain 
something is to bear a determination relation to it. But mathematical entities are not more capable 
of bearing such relations than nominalistic entities. This means that more general tools for 
theoretical assessment, like simplicity, must be employed. If Explanation is to remain a viable 
option, then the platonist needs to offer a comparison tool on which DME explanations can fare 
better than IME explanations.  
The Prediction Criterion 
 A plausible candidate for such a tool is the prediction criterion, which comes from a 
strategy developed by Heather Douglas for the assessment and comparison of competing 
explanations. Douglas says that we ought to judge explanations by their “ability to generate new 
[successful] predictions”.49 Given two equivalent explanations of the same phenomenon, the one 
that successfully predicts the occurrence of new phenomena is better.  One way to justify the use 
of this criterion for scientific realists is by appeal to the no-miracles argument.50 An explanation’s 
ability to make successful novel predictions is miraculous unless the explanation is true and the 
nomological relations which determine the explanandum also determine in some way the predicted 
phenomena.  
 We can see an example of how this could be used to support DME using the honeycomb 
case. On the DME account, the spatial efficiency of the mathematical hexagonal grid determines 
the efficiency of the physical honeycomb, because the hexagonal grid is instantiated in the 
honeycomb. We can extrapolate that other properties of the hexagonal grid should also determine 
                                                          
49 Douglas (2009): 445. 
50 For independent support of this kind of no-miracles argument, see Worrall (1989). There, John Worrall argues 




properties of the honeycomb. This means that if we discover through mathematical proof that the 
hexagonal grid has some property x which, if had by the honeycomb, would have empirical 
consequences which have not yet been observed, we can predict that those consequences will be 
observed. Observation of the consequences would confirm the prediction.   
 Such a prediction could not be made using the IME version of the honeycomb explanation. 
On that explanation, there is a nomological relation between the nominalistic property having-the-
honeycomb-structure-of-hexagonal-grid and the efficiency property. But there is no nomological 
relation between the mathematical posits and any of the physical entities or properties involved in 
the explanation. This means that, while any new properties of the honeycomb can be incorporated 
post hoc into a new explanation (the nominalist can say that there is an additional nomological 
relation between having-the-honeycomb-structure-of-hexagonal-grid and property x), the 
explanation of property x could not have been predicted by the IME efficiency explanation. This 
is because the explanation of property x is in no way determined by the nomological relations 
present in the efficiency relation. Given the prediction criterion (assuming that there is some 
property x), the fact that DME supports the new prediction and IME cannot is a point strongly in 
favor of DME.  
 Even a successful prediction like this would not necessarily justify an IBE inference to the 
truth of DME and the existence of mathematical entities, however. Ontological simplicity will still 
always be in favor of IME. Also, some factors of the prediction itself are relevant to the strength 
of the evidence it offers. The novelty and generality of the prediction may hold some weight in 
deciding how miraculous the prediction would be if it were not supported by a nomological 
relation. A lucky guess is not a miracle. Also, even IME can support mere extensions of an 




property serving as explanans is understood as the property of being such that some set of 
mathematical axioms can be interpreted as about that entity. Thus the explanation holds not only 
for some particular entity which has the nominalistic property, but also for any physical entities 
about which that set of axioms can be interpreted. IME too, then, can explain the success of 
predictions that extend an explanation to appropriately similar entities. The prediction criterion 
does not therefore necessarily decide IBE in favor of DME (unlike ontological simplicity for IME), 
but it does make it possible for DME to compete.  
The Naturalist Upshot 
 The prediction criterion is consistent with scientific realism and Explanation, as it follows 
from no-miracles. For that reason alone, it ought to be accepted by the explanatory nominalist. But 
the criterion also helps Explanation address a broader worry it faces as a naturalist thesis and helps 
it to compete with Indispensability. This worry is that the ontological condition set by Explanation 
+ Determination is scientifically underdetermined.  
 The central commitment of contemporary scientific realism is naturalism, so scientific 
realist ontological commitments should follow from scientific practice. But whether an entity is 
explanatory and bears certain nomological or causal relations can be scientifically ambiguous. The 
original versions of the mathematical explanations presented by scientific practice (prior to the 
consideration of DME and IME) do not specify which entities are playing explanatory roles. This 
means that assessing which entities are supported under Explanation may require extra-scientific 
tools and conditions. This is in tension with naturalism.  
 Indispensability and confirmation holism, on the other hand, do support univocal 
naturalism. Holism focuses ontological commitment on an unambiguous feature of fully fleshed 
out scientific theories (the entities quantified over). Scientific practice itself addresses which 




interpretive work outside of that used within science to produce theories is required to see which 
entities are quantified over. The supporter of Explanation aims to deny confirmation holism and 
reduce the commitments required for scientific realism, but denying confirmation holism does not 
further naturalism if doing so requires us to institute new extra-scientific standards. 
 The prediction criterion offers a way of assuaging this worry for Explanation. The criterion 
is a tool that can reliably and naturalistically guide arbitration between explanations which appeal 
to different entities (and different nomological relations). And it does so from explicit scientific 
practice – predictions made and confirmed. Realists can expect that only true explanations, which 
feature the right entities in nomological and causal roles, will exhibit novel predictive success and 
thus meet the prediction criterion.  
 The prediction criterion brings great benefit and it, or something like it, ought to be 
accepted by proponents of Explanation on both sides of the mathematical realism debate. This 
means that the criterion should be available for explanatory platonists to use to support DME. The 
only problem is that there are no successful novel predictions from DME explanations, let alone 
predictions that decide IBE in favor of DME. The supporter of DME has two ways to look for such 
evidence. The first is to examine the historical scientific record, identify mathematical 
explanations, and see if successful predictions have been made on the basis of mathematical 
features of those explanations. The aim would be to either justify a positive induction for the future 
of mathematical explanation or to develop strategies for future mathematical prediction. The 
second way is to consider our current best theories, identify mathematical explanations in them, 
and generate new predictions from those explanations which have empirical consequences. This 
could be done by tabulating the additional properties of the mathematical entities involved 




by the physical entities involved. While it is not clear that we have any reason to expect there to 
be evidence of this kind of success for mathematical explanations, it is the case that mathematical 
explanations themselves (of the kind subject to DME interpretation) have not consistently been 
recognized as such through the history of science. 
Conclusion 
 Unless and until successful predictions can be produced that decide the debate conclusively 
in favor of DME, DME is more ontologically profligate than IME and therefore a worse 
explanation. Given the current state of our scientific evidence, Explanation is thus not a viable 
platonist ontological condition. The scientific realist platonist must seek alternative justification. 
Indispensability offers that justification. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best 
scientific theories, and so Indispensability does support platonism. Mathematical entities play a 
variety of indispensable organizing roles in our best scientific theories. Scientific realist platonists 
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